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                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____ 
 
No. 12-2881 
______ 
 
DAVID RODRIGUEZ 
 
v. 
 
GERALD L. ROZUM; THE DISTRICT OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
Appellants 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-00393) 
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 13, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 1, 2013) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 After a non-jury waiver trial in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 
Appellee David Rodriguez (―Rodriguez‖) was convicted of Murder in the Second 
 2 
 
Degree, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder.
1
  He was acquitted of Robbery, 
Theft, and various other offenses.  After exhausting his state court remedies, Rodriguez 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
claiming that he was unconstitutionally convicted based on insufficient evidence.  The 
District Court agreed and granted the petition.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
reverse. 
I.  The Trial
2
 
A. Steven MacNamee’s Testimony   
 Rodriguez sold marijuana to Steven MacNamee (―Steven‖) three or four times a 
month over a five month period.
3
  Generally, Steven would purchase $400 worth of drugs 
at a time.  On February 8, 1998, Steven and Rodriguez arranged to meet to conduct a 
drug transaction.  Steven arrived in his white car, while Rodriguez arrived in a red station 
wagon, accompanied by Luis Casiano (―Casiano‖), who was Rodriguez‘s codefendant at 
trial, and an individual known as ―Macho.‖  Rodriguez and his two companions got into 
Steven‘s car. After seeing the drugs, Steven expressed doubts as to their quality.  The 
parties agreed that Steven would take a sample of the drugs to his brother, for whom he 
                                              
1
 These crimes are, and were at the time of trial, codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b) (second 
degree murder); 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901 and 2502 (attempted murder); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 
(aggravated assault). 
 
2
 This Court, like the District Court, views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, as it was the verdict winner at trial.  Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 
2148, 2152 (2012) (per curiam).   
 
3
 There was a dispute at trial as to the type of drug—the Commonwealth alleged it was 
marijuana, while Rodriguez and his codefendant, Luis Casiano, alleged it was cocaine.  
The type of the drug does not affect the disposition of this case. 
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was purchasing them, and would let Rodriguez know if the drugs were acceptable.  
Steven said he would be willing to pay $350, as opposed to $400, for the current batch of 
drugs if Rodriguez could not provide a better product.   
 Steven later paged Rodriguez to indicate the drugs were not acceptable.  
Rodriguez called Steven, and said he could not sell the drugs for $350; Steven said he 
would wait for Rodriguez to acquire a better product.  Eventually, after an argumentative 
conversation, Rodriguez agreed to sell the drugs for the lower price.   
 Steven brought his brother, David MacNamee (―David‖) to the meeting.  David sat 
in the front passenger seat, and was tasked with counting the money during the ride to the 
meeting.  Rodriguez again arrived in the red station wagon, accompanied by Casiano and 
Macho.  Rodriguez parked immediately behind the MacNamees‘ car.  According to 
Steven, Rodriguez, Casiano, and Macho all approached his car, and despite Steven‘s 
request that only Rodriguez enter, all three of them got into the back of Steven‘s car.4  
Macho sat in the rear driver-side seat, Rodriguez sat in the middle seat, and Casiano sat in 
the rear passenger-side seat.  Once in the car, Macho handed the drugs to Rodriguez, who 
then handed them to David.  David gave the money to Rodriguez.  David either placed 
the drugs on the center console between the two front seats, or gave the drugs to Steven 
who placed them in the center console.   
 At this point, Rodriguez began speaking Spanish to the individual Steven believed 
was Casiano.  As this was happening, Steven turned forward to start the car, and he heard 
                                              
4
 At trial, there was a dispute as to whether Casiano ever got into Steven‘s car—the trial 
judge found that Casiano had not, and acquitted him of all charges.  Whether Casiano 
was in the car is irrelevant to this matter.   
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a door open.  He then heard three loud ―bangs,‖ and as he turned towards the rear of the 
car, he saw several flashes and a window shatter.  The shooting stopped briefly, and 
Steven saw the individual he believed to be Casiano halfway out of the car, on the rear 
passenger-side of the vehicle.  After Steven said, ―You don‘t have to do this,‖ the 
individual moved back into the car.  During this pause in the shooting, Steven saw a hand 
reach up to the center console and grab the drugs from it, and saw Rodriguez leaning 
back against the back seat, holding the drugs in his hand.  The individual Steven believed 
to be Casiano began shooting again, hitting Steven in his right shoulder.  The shooter 
continued to move along the back seat and shot Steven in the face.  Before exiting out the 
rear driver-side door, the shooter fired one more shot, hitting Steven in the shoulder 
again.   
 Steven attempted to respond with his own firearm, heard another shot, noticed his 
brother was bleeding heavily, and drove to the hospital.  As he pulled out, he collided 
with the red station wagon.  As it drove past him, Steven saw the station wagon stop to 
allow the shooter to get in, and then continue to drive away.  David died from his injuries 
while Steven survived, and eventually identified Rodriguez from a series of photo arrays.  
B.  Detective Mangoni’s Testimony 
 Detective Mangoni testified regarding a statement Rodriguez gave to police.  In 
that statement, Rodriguez confirmed that he went to sell marijuana to Steven, and that he, 
Macho, and Casiano got into Steven‘s car, with Macho in the rear passenger seat, 
Rodriguez in the middle, and Casiano in the rear driver seat.  Rodriguez gave the drugs to 
Macho, who handed them up front, and David handed the money to Rodriguez.  A blue 
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van pulled up behind Steven‘s car, and Casiano left Steven‘s car and got into Rodriguez‘s 
red station wagon.  Macho then pulled out a gun and shot David, and as Rodriguez was 
leaving the car, Macho began shooting Steven.  Rodriguez ―took the weed back from 
Steve before [Rodriguez] got out of Steve‘s car.‖  (Transcript (―Tr.‖) 10/6/99 at 139.)  
Macho kept the money.   
 After the shooting, Rodriguez drove them to Whitaker Avenue and parked the car, 
while Macho called a friend from a payphone.  Macho‘s friend arrived soon thereafter, 
picked up all three individuals, leaving the red station wagon at the payphone, and drove 
Rodriguez and Casiano to Rodriguez‘s home.  Rodriguez kept the drugs, while Macho 
kept both the gun and the money.
5
   
C.  Luis Casiano’s Testimony 
 Casiano testified that Rodriguez sold cocaine, not marijuana.  Before Casiano and 
Rodriguez left Rodriguez‘s house to meet the MacNamees, Macho arrived to speak about 
some money that Macho owed to Rodriguez.  Macho also wanted to buy more cocaine.  
Rodriguez said he was busy with another customer.  Macho asked if he could accompany 
Rodriguez to the transaction with the MacNamees, and Rodriguez agreed.   
 According to Casiano, at the meeting Steven said his car would be too crowded if 
they all got in, and so Casiano went back and waited in the red station wagon while 
Macho and Rodriguez entered Steven‘s car.  As Casiano waited, a blue minivan with its 
                                              
5
 The Commonwealth also called a deputy Medical Examiner to testify as to the causes of 
David‘s death, and the distance from which the firearm was fired that killed him.  The 
Commonwealth called other witnesses, but their testimony pertained solely to the case 
against Casiano, repeated testimony provided by other witnesses, or provided other 
evidence not relevant to this matter.  
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high beams on pulled up behind the red station wagon.  He heard three shots from 
Steven‘s car, and saw Rodriguez crawl on the ground and run towards the station wagon.  
Rodriguez exited Steven‘s vehicle with the drugs in his hands.  Rodriguez started the car 
and pulled up alongside Steven‘s car as more shots were fired.  Macho then got in the 
station wagon, and they drove away; Rodriguez told Casiano that Macho had shot one of 
the MacNamees.  Casiano testified that the minivan followed them as they drove away.  
After eluding the minivan, Rodriguez drove them to Whitaker Avenue, and Macho used a 
payphone to call a friend to pick them up.  Rodriguez and Casiano left the station wagon 
because they were afraid to keep driving it, and got a ride home from Macho‘s friend. 
D.  Rodriguez’s Testimony 
 Rodriguez provided testimony similar to Casiano‘s regarding the events leading up 
to the shooting.  Once in Steven‘s car, Macho passed the drugs to Rodriguez, who gave 
them to David.  Rodriguez testified that he was sitting in the rear middle seat of Steven‘s 
car.  According to Rodriguez, he and Steven disagreed on the appropriate price for the 
drugs.  Rodriguez was exiting the car when he saw a blue minivan pull up; he then heard 
a gunshot.  Rodriguez dove to the ground, and crawled towards the red station wagon.  
As Rodriguez drove away, he saw Macho get out of Steven‘s car—Macho told Rodriguez 
to stop, which he did, and Rodriguez allowed Macho to get into the car.  At this point, 
Rodriguez drove to Whitaker Avenue, waited for Macho to use the payphone, and got a 
ride home from Macho‘s friend.  Rodriguez took the drugs with him, but claimed the 
MacNamees had kept the money.   
E.  Trial Judge’s Decision 
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 The trial judge issued her decision from the bench.  She found that Macho was the 
shooter, and found Rodriguez guilty of second degree murder, attempted murder, and 
aggravated assault based on accomplice liability, because Rodriguez was responsible for 
Macho‘s presence in the MacNamees‘ car.    The judge found Rodriguez and Macho were 
conspirators in the crime of selling drugs, but that Rodriguez did not have the specific 
intent to kill David MacNamee.  The judge found Rodriguez responsible for the drug 
transaction which resulted in a robbery, and since robbery is one of the enumerated 
underlying offenses for the purposes of second degree murder, the judge found Rodriguez 
guilty of second degree murder.  The judge specifically stated that she did not believe it 
was Rodriguez‘s intent to commit a robbery, and therefore acquitted him of robbery.   
II.  Appellate and Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 On direct appeal, two judges of a three judge panel of the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court vacated Rodriguez‘s conviction, based on insufficient evidence.6  However, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court heard the case en banc, and affirmed the conviction without 
a published opinion.  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 860 A.2d 1134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).  
In its unpublished opinion, the en banc court found that the trial judge‘s remarks from the 
bench were not ―findings of fact‖ but instead were ―gratuitous prefatory remarks . . . 
intended to soften the blow of the guilty verdict and were offered as a courtesy to litigants 
and onlookers.‖  (Appendix (―App.‖) at 164.)  The court determined that, based on the 
                                              
6
 The Superior Court panel initially found that a defendant cannot be convicted of second 
degree murder when he is acquitted of the underlying felony, and there is no common 
design to commit robbery.  In so doing, the court relied on the trial judge‘s statements 
from the bench regarding Rodriguez‘s intent.  The dissenting judge believed this reliance 
improper.   
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evidence admitted at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.  
The en banc court mentioned the following as establishing sufficient evidence for 
accomplice liability:  Rodriguez brought Macho, who owed Rodriguez money, to the 
drug transaction, where the MacNamees would be waiting with money; drove Macho 
away from the shooting and to a payphone; waited for Macho to call others; and switched 
getaway cars.  (App. at 169.)   
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.  Rodriguez filed a 
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (―PCRA‖) petition, which was denied.  This 
denial was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.   
 Rodriguez filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  A Magistrate Judge determined that 
Rodriguez was not entitled to relief.  The District Court disagreed, finding that 
Rodriguez‘s conviction violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution because 
it was not supported by sufficient evidence.  Specifically, the District Court found there 
was insufficient evidence that Rodriguez had the intent to commit or facilitate the 
commission of the robbery, and therefore there was insufficient evidence to establish 
second degree murder via accomplice liability.  Appellants timely appealed, arguing that 
the District Court improperly ignored or discredited pivotal evidence, and misapplied 
Pennsylvania precedent.  Rodriguez, needless to say, disagrees, and argues that the 
District Court appropriately determined his conviction was supported by insufficient 
evidence.  
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III.  Standard and Scope of Review
7
 
 ―As the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, our review of its 
order [granting] habeas relief is plenary.‖  Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 
2013).  When a petitioner alleges entitlement to habeas relief by challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his state court conviction, federal courts apply a 
―twice-deferential standard‖ of review.  Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2152 
(2012) (per curiam). Under the first part of this standard, ―[t]he evidence is sufficient to 
support a conviction whenever, ‗after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‘‖  Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979)).  In applying this standard, we consider ―all of the evidence . . . in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution‖ and even if the record ―supports conflicting inferences [the 
reviewing court] must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record— 
that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution.‖  Jackson, 
443 U.S. at 319, 326.   
 The second layer of deference only permits a federal court to set aside the state-
court conviction if ―the decision was objectively unreasonable.‖  Matthews, 132 S. Ct. at 
2152 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 
397, 418 (3d Cir. 2011) (―[A] decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and 
based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless [the 
                                              
7
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241, and 2254(a).  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.   
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state court‘s findings of fact are] objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 
presented in the state-court proceeding.‖ (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).   
We determine reasonableness based on the record evidence at the time of the state court 
adjudication.  Blystone, 664 F.3d at 418.   
 When reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging an unconstitutional 
conviction due to insufficient evidence, federal courts do not review the reasoning 
underlying the state court‘s decision.  Instead, we focus on whether the state court‘s 
ultimate decision—affirmation of the conviction—was supported by sufficient record 
evidence.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (providing that petition for writ shall only be 
granted if the state court‘s ―adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision‖ that was 
contrary to federal law or based on ―unreasonable determination of the facts‖ (emphasis 
added)); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 180 n.3. (3d Cir. 1998) (noting state appellate 
court‘s reasoning was incorrect, but because result was proper, petitioner was not entitled 
to habeas relief); see also Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that 
when conducting habeas review, ―we are determining the reasonableness of the state 
courts‘ ‗decision,‘ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), not grading their papers‖).  
 The fact of a potentially inconsistent verdict does not affect our analysis, and does 
not affect the constitutionality of the conviction, even where the verdict was rendered by 
a judge rather than a jury.  Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345–48 (1981) (per curiam).  
―Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment‖ so 
―[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary.‖  Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 
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(1932).
8
  Therefore, Rodriguez‘s robbery acquittal does not preclude us from considering 
record evidence establishing his involvement in the robbery when we are reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence vis-à-vis his felony murder conviction.     
 Our focus is whether, regardless of the reasoning of the state appellate court and 
the robbery acquittal, ―the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318.  We ―must consider all of the 
                                              
8
 Dunn went on to state, ―If separate indictments had been presented against the 
defendant for possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and had been separately 
tried, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could not be 
pleaded as res judicata of the other.‖  284 U.S. at 393.  A later case which upheld Dunn 
noted that this last sentence was no longer correct, because collateral estoppel may be 
invoked by a criminal defendant.  United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64 (1984).  The 
Court did not discuss the specific language that ―[e]ach count in an indictment is regarded 
as if it was a separate indictment,‖ id. at 62, but it did note that ―the Dunn rule rests on a 
sound rationale that is independent of its theories of res judicata, and it therefore survives 
an attack based upon its presently erroneous reliance on such theories.‖  Id. at 64.  
Furthermore, several other Courts of Appeals have since invoked Dunn‘s ―separate 
indictment‖ language when deciding inconsistent verdict cases.  See United States v. 
Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809, 824 (8th Cir. 2011) (―As the Supreme Court has explained, 
consistency in the verdict is not required because each count in an indictment is regarded 
as if it was a separate indictment.‖ (citing Powell, 469 U.S. at 62)); United States v. 
Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2008) (―‗Each count in an indictment is regarded 
as if it was a separate indictment.‘‖ (quoting Powell, 469 U.S. at 62)); United States v. 
Pisman, 443 F.3d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that Powell ―reiterated that each count 
in an indictment is regarded as if it were a separate indictment‖).   
 In addition, this Court stated, in a pre-Powell case, that ―consistency in the 
verdicts is not necessary, even though the same evidence is offered in support of each. 
Each count in the present indictment charges a separate crime and it is enough if there is 
sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s verdict of guilty on any one.‖  United States v. 
Dolasco, 184 F.2d 746, 749 (3d Cir. 1950) (citation and footnote omitted).  Two years 
prior to Dolasco, the Supreme Court noted that res judicata applied in criminal as well as 
civil cases.  See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 (1948) (―But res judicata 
may be a defense in a second prosecution.  That doctrine applies to criminal as well as 
civil proceedings and operates to conclude those matters in issue which the verdict 
determine though the offenses be different.‖ (citations omitted)).   
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evidence admitted by the trial court‖ when making this determination.  McDaniel v. 
Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010).   
IV.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we assess the record evidence in 
light of the relevant controlling state law defining the elements of the crime or theories of 
liability.  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 324 n.16; see also Orban v. Vaughn, 123 F.3d 727, 
731 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating we analyze such claims ―with explicit reference to the 
substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law‖).   
A.  Relevant Pennsylvania Law 
 In determining that there was insufficient evidence to sustain Rodriguez‘s 
conviction, the District Court erred by ignoring controlling Pennsylvania case law and 
key evidence in the record.   
 A person commits second degree murder by committing a criminal homicide 
―while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a 
felony.‖  18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b).  For purposes of second degree murder, ―perpetration of a 
felony‖ is defined as ―the act of the defendant in engaging in or being an accomplice in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to 
commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, 
burglary, or kidnapping.‖  Id. at § 2502(d).  Therefore, while robbery is an attendant 
felony for purposes of second degree murder, drug trafficking is not.   
 In Pennsylvania, a defendant commits robbery if ―in the course of committing a 
theft, he: (i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another‖ or ―commits or threatens 
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immediately to commit any felony of the first or second-degree.‖  Id. at § 3701(1).  ―An 
act shall be deemed ‗in the course of committing a theft‘ if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission.‖  Id. at § 3701(2).   
 A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if: ―(1) with the intent of 
promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person 
to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or 
committing it; or (2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.‖  
Id. at § 306(c).   
 In Pennsylvania, a defendant need not be convicted of the underlying felony to be 
convicted of second degree murder: ―[w]hat is required is that the actor be found guilty of 
a homicide in the progress of committing a felony with sufficient evidence to establish a 
felony was in process and the killing occurred.‖  Commonwealth v. Munchinski, 585 A.2d 
471, 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).   
 To establish accomplice liability, the Commonwealth ―must show by substantive 
evidence that the accused was an ‗active partner in the intent to commit [the crime].‘‖  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 344 A.2d 512, 514 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. McFadden, 292 A.2d 358 (Pa. 1972)).  ―An agreement is not required, 
as only aid is required‖ and ―[t]he least degree of concert or collusion in the commission 
of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as an accomplice.‖  
Commonwealth v. Graves, 463 A.2d 467, 470 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).  Evidence 
establishing that a defendant was an accessory after the fact is alone insufficient to hold 
 14 
 
an individual liable as an accomplice. Commonwealth v. McCleary, 381 A.2d 434, 436 
(Pa. 1977).
9
   
B.  The District Court’s Analysis 
 The District Court purported to first address the en banc Pennsylvania Superior 
Court‘s decision to determine whether it was unreasonable and to then, independently, 
analyze the record evidence to assess its sufficiency.  As the latter analysis is dispositive, 
we focus on it.   
1.  The District Court Misapplied Relevant Pennsylvania Case Law 
 The District Court, when conducting its independent review of the record, divided 
the potential evidence of Rodriguez‘s intent into two types:  pre-shooting and post-
shooting evidence.  The District Court determined there was no pre-shooting evidence of 
an intent to facilitate or promote the commission of a crime, which is one method of 
establishing accomplice liability in Pennsylvania.  18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c).  It then concluded 
that the post-shooting evidence was insufficient, relying on the rule that ―mere presence 
at the scene of the offense is not sufficient to establish culpability as an aider and abettor, 
nor is presence at the scene in combination with flight from the scene.‖  Moore v. Deputy 
                                              
9
 It would be possible to distinguish McCleary from this case.  In McCleary, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the idea that ―one who only aids flight without 
participating in the felony plan and without knowledge of a death in the commission of 
the felony can be held responsible for the killing.‖  381 A.2d at 436 (emphasis added).  
Here, the evidence establishes Rodriguez‘s knowledge of, and participation in, the 
robbery, and his knowledge of the murder, as it happened mere feet away from him.  
However, we do not decide this case by distinguishing it from McCleary; it is obvious 
under other, affirmative Pennsylvania holdings that Rodriguez‘s conviction was 
supported by sufficient evidence.   
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Comm’r(s) of SCI-Huntingdon, 946 F.2d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Commonwealth 
v. Goodman, 350 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1976) and Commonwealth v. Jones, 435 A.2d 223, 225 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)).  As a result, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish Rodriguez had intended to commit or facilitate the commission of the robbery 
of the MacNamees. 
 As an initial matter, the above quotation, upon which the District Court relies, only 
partially states the rule in Pennsylvania:  though it is true that presence at and flight from 
a crime scene, alone, are insufficient to establish accomplice liability, such evidence 
when combined ―with other direct or circumstantial evidence may provide a sufficient 
basis for conviction provided the conviction is predicated upon more than mere suspicion 
or conjecture.‖  Commonwealth v. Rosetti, 469 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 
(citation omitted).   
 A review of the facts of Rosetti demonstrates that Rodriguez‘s conviction was 
―based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture.‖  Id.  In Rosetti, the appellant was 
convicted of criminal trespass under a theory of accomplice liability.  The victim heard a 
noise at his door, went to answer it, and saw appellant standing twenty feet away.  
Rosetti, 469 A.2d at 1122.  After the victim closed the door, he heard another noise at the 
door, and then witnessed a second man through a small window in the door.  Id.  When 
the victim‘s phone rang, appellant and his companion fled, and were seen fleeing 
together, conversing as they ran, and appellant‘s companion was arrested with a pipe 
wrench in his possession.  Id. at 1122–23.  The court found the following facts sufficient 
to establish accomplice liability:  Appellant was seen outside the home when the crime 
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began; Appellant‘s companion was then seen breaking into the home moments later; 
Appellant and companion fled together; they were seen conversing together in flight a 
short time later near the crime scene; a pipe wrench was found in possession of 
Appellant‘s companion.  Id. at 1124.   
 Here, there is sufficient ―other direct or circumstantial evidence‖ of Rodriguez‘s 
conduct to establish accomplice liability.  First, Rodriguez was not merely present at the 
crime scene as an innocent bystander: he was an active participant in the robbery, taking 
the drugs from the MacNamees‘ after they had given Macho the money and after Macho 
had begun shooting.  Second, Rodriguez did more than simply flee from a crime scene at 
which he happened to be present: he began fleeing, stopped his escape to assist Macho‘s 
flight, drove Macho to a payphone, and then waited while Macho procured new 
transportation so Rodriguez could abandon his car.  Just like the defendant in Rosetti, 
Rodriguez was present when the crime occurred, and he and the principal (Macho) fled 
together, in concert.  Unlike the defendant in Rosetti, evidence established that Rodriguez 
was also an active participant in the crime.  Additionally, immediately before the 
shooting commenced, Rodriguez spoke in Spanish to the shooter, a language not 
understood by the MacNamees.  The timing of this conversation and its 
incomprehensibility to the victims, the fact that Rodriguez acted in apparent concert with 
Macho by reaching forward to take the drugs during a brief pause in the shooting, and 
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Rodriguez‘s and Macho‘s cooperative flight from the scene, was more than enough 
evidence, in light of Rosetti, to sustain Rodriguez‘s conviction.10 
2.  The District Court Ignored Relevant Pennsylvania Case Law 
 Aside from misapplying applicable Pennsylvania case law, the District Court also 
ignored decisions from Pennsylvania courts which establish that the defendant‘s conduct 
after the underlying felony or murder can provide sufficient evidence of the defendant‘s 
intent to commit the underlying felony.  Commonwealth v. Legg, 417 A.2d 1152, 1154–
55 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Waters, 418 A.2d 312, 318 (Pa. 1980).   
 In Legg, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant must have formed 
the intent to commit the underlying felony prior to the killing to sustain a conviction of 
second degree murder.  Id. at 1154.  However, the court reaffirmed the principle that ―the 
intent to commit the felony when the act of killing occurred [may be] established by an 
inference arising from circumstances or acts committed very shortly after the slaying.‖  
                                              
10
 The two Pennsylvania cases upon which this Court relied in Moore to explain that 
presence at and flight from a crime scene alone are insufficient to establish accomplice 
liability provide illustrative applications of the principle.   
 In Commonwealth v. Goodman, Appellant‘s codefendant was seen coming from 
the rear of a building holding a box of frozen meat.  The codefendant was ordered by 
police to stand against the wall.  Appellant then emerged from the exit and was also told 
to stand against the wall.  The codefendant threw the box at police and fled, Appellant 
then fled in the opposite direction.  Appellant was rearrested thirty minutes later with no 
inculpatory evidence in his possession.  This was insufficient to sustain the conviction for 
burglary and larceny.  Goodman, 350 A.2d at 811–12.   
 In Commonwealth v. Jones, Appellant was seen running from an alley 
approximately one block from the burglarized store.  The only other evidence against 
Appellant was testimony from an officer that no one else was present on the street.  435 
A.2d at 225–26. 
 As explained supra, the evidence establishes that Rodriguez‘s role in the robbery 
and murder was much greater than those of the defendants in these paradigmatic cases.   
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Id. at 1155 (emphasis added); see also id. at n.4.  In Waters, the court determined that the 
same principle applied when trying to prove a common design to commit the underlying 
felony.  418 A.2d at 318.     
 This principle was applied in Commonwealth v. Olds, 469 A.2d 1072 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1983).  In that case, Olds, Bonner, and Allen were driving around town, when Bonner 
suggested robbing a cigar store.  Id. at 1074.  Olds said he wanted to get something to eat, 
and the group drove to the cigar store, at which point Allen said, ―I‘m going to rob the 
store,‖ to which Olds replied, ―yeah right.‖  Id.  In the store, Olds went to purchase a bag 
of chips at the register; as he was doing so, Allen followed another customer out of the 
store, fired a shot, and after the customer offered his wallet, shot the customer twice.  Id.  
Olds and Allen jumped in the car as Bonner pulled up, and Bonner dropped them off near 
Olds‘s house.  Id. at 1075.  Olds was convicted of second degree murder based on 
conspiracy liability, which requires the same finding of intent as accomplice liability.  Id.; 
see also Commonwealth v. Anderson, 402 A.2d 546, 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (―The 
intent required for criminal conspiracy is the same as that required for accomplice 
liability: ‗intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.‘‖)   
 The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, noting that the common intent to 
commit the underlying offense could be ―inferred from the circumstances or acts 
committed either before or shortly after the slaying.‖  Olds, 469 A.2d at 1075.  The court 
found ―[i]t is especially significant that the three participants arrived at the scene together 
and left together after the crime had been committed. We find, therefore, that the jury in 
this case was entitled to conclude that appellant was aware of an incipient robbery and 
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performed acts evidencing an agreement to participate therein.‖  Id. (citation omitted).  
The court noted that this evidence was more than ―mere presence at the scene of a crime 
[or] mere association with a perpetrator,‖ as that alone would be insufficient.  Id.   
 Here, the evidence is far stronger than that in Olds.  Rodriguez drove Macho, the 
shooter, to the location, and Rodriguez watched as Macho shot the MacNamees at close 
range.  Unlike the defendant in Olds, who did not actively participate in the robbery, 
Rodriguez took the drugs from the MacNamees as they were being shot.  Then, again 
unlike the defendant in Olds who was merely a passenger, Rodriguez halted his flight 
from the scene of the crime to allow Macho to enter his vehicle, drove Macho away from 
the scene, and took him to a payphone.  Rodriguez then waited while Macho called 
another friend and abandoned the getaway car.  After securing Macho‘s and his own 
escape, Rodriguez took the drugs while Macho took the money.  The evidence regarding 
Rodriguez‘s involvement in the crime, both during and after the shooting, was far greater 
than that which supported the conviction in Olds, and is precisely the sort of post-offense 
conduct which may provide circumstantial evidence of criminal intent under Legg.    
3.  The District Court Ignored Dispositive Evidence 
 This application of Pennsylvania law to the evidence highlights the third error 
committed by the District Court:  the District Court both ignored key evidence and failed 
to view evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.   
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 For example, the District Court determined that the en banc Superior Court 
erroneously concluded that ―Macho took the cash, and Rodriguez took the drugs.‖11 
(App. at 64.)  The District Court found that ―the record is devoid of any evidence that 
‗Macho took the cash‘‖ and that ―[t]he evidence was that the drugs were in [Rodriguez‘s] 
possession when Macho began shooting, and there is no analysis-worthy evidence as to 
what happened to the money after the shooting began.‖  (Id.)  This is a false summation 
of the record evidence, and appears to involve an impermissible credibility determination. 
 There is evidence in the record that Macho took the money.  Detective Mangoni 
testified about the contents of statements that Rodriguez gave to the police.  According to 
Mangoni, Rodriguez said that he had taken the drugs from the MacNamees, that Macho 
took the money, and that Macho kept the money after dropping off Rodriguez and 
Casiano.  (Tr. 10/6/99 at 139 (―Macho had the money with him‖ after getting into 
Appellee‘s car after the shooting); id. at 140 (―Macho took [the gun] with him and the 
money.‖).)  Steven MacNamee also testified that the money had changed hands before 
the shooting.  (Tr. 10/4/99 at 57.)  
 In addition, evidence established the drugs were not in Rodriguez‘s possession 
when the shooting began.  According to Steven, the drugs had been placed in the center 
console when the shooting began, and during a brief pause after the first shots were fired, 
he saw a hand reach up and take the drugs from the center console, and he then turned 
around and saw Rodriguez holding the drugs in his hand.  (Tr. 10/5/99 at 17.)  It is 
                                              
11
 This is but one example of the District Court mistakenly focusing on the state appellate 
court‘s reasoning, rather than the record evidence as a whole. 
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unclear why the District Court found this evidence was not ―analysis-worthy,‖ or why the 
District Court found it was able to make such a determination.  See Marshall v. 
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983) (―28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts 
no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by 
the state trial court, but not by them.‖)   
 The District Court disregards evidence regarding Rodriguez‘s conduct after the 
shooting.  According to the District Court, ―no evidence in the record shows that 
petitioner‘s conduct after Macho shot the MacNamees was anything more than fearful 
flight from a scene at which a customer had unexpectedly shot two men.‖  (App. at 63.)  
In reaching this conclusion, the District Court failed to discuss the fact that Rodriguez 
began to drive away, saw Macho, who he had just seen kill two people at close range, and 
paused to allow Macho to get into his car and thus provide him an avenue of escape.  The 
District Court similarly disregarded the evidence that Rodriguez drove Macho to a 
payphone, got into a second getaway car with Macho, and abandoned his car, which 
demonstrates a degree of concert indicative of common or shared intent.  Rosetti, 469 
A.2d at 1122–23; Olds, 469 A.2d at 1075.   
 The District Court also discredited Steven‘s testimony by, for example, noting that 
Steven  
testified at trial that the money had exchanged hands before the 
shooting began. However, this testimony was shown on cross-
examination to be inconsistent with Steven MacNamee‘s statement 
to police and his preliminary hearing testimony. Moreover, neither 
the trial court nor the en banc Superior Court analyzed or cited 
Steven MacNamee‘s testimony. 
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  (App. at 64 n. 20 (citations omitted).)  Aside from once again impermissibly focusing on 
the reasoning of the state courts, rather than the record evidence, the District Court 
weighed the evidence, which the Supreme Court has clearly and vehemently proscribed.  
Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 434; see also Matthews, 132 S. Ct. at 2149 (noting lower federal 
court‘s decision was ―a textbook example of what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) proscribes: using federal habeas corpus review as a 
vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts‖ (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).    
 In sum, the District Court ignored several important Pennsylvania cases and 
disregarded dispositive facts in the record, to wit: Macho owed Rodriguez money; 
Rodriguez drove Macho to the transaction with the MacNamees; he had Macho rather 
than Casiano accompany him into the MacNamees‘ car; he spoke briefly in Spanish to 
Macho immediately before the shooting began; he took the drugs from the MacNamees 
as Macho began shooting them, during a brief pause in the shooting; he exited the vehicle 
and began to drive away, but stopped the car to allow Macho to get in; he drove to a 
payphone to allow Macho to make a phone call; he waited for Macho to make that phone 
call, and then for Macho‘s friend to arrive; he got a ride with Macho‘s friends and 
abandoned the car he used to escape the crime scene; Macho‘s friends drove him home; 
and he kept the drugs while Macho kept the money.  When this evidence is viewed in 
conjunction with applicable Pennsylvania case law, it is more than sufficient to establish 
that Rodriguez acted ―with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
[robbery]‖ by ―aid[ing] . . . [Macho] in . . . committing it.‖  18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c). 
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V.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.     
